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1Enhancing Secrecy Rate in Cognitive Radio
Networks via Stackelberg Game
Ali Al-Talabani, Student Member, IEEE, Yansha Deng, Member, IEEE,
A. Nallanathan, Senior Member, IEEE, and Huan X. Nguyen, Member, IEEE.
Abstract—In this paper, a game theory based cooperation
scheme is investigated to enhance the physical layer security in
both primary and secondary transmissions of a cognitive radio
network (CRN). In CRNs, the primary network may decide to
lease its own spectrum for a fraction of time to the secondary
nodes in exchange of appropriate remuneration. We consider
the secondary transmitter node as a trusted relay for primary
transmission to forward primary messages in a decode-and-
forward (DF) fashion and, at the same time, allows part of
its available power to be used to transmit artificial noise (i.e.,
jamming signal) to enhance primary and secondary secrecy rates.
In order to allocate power between message and jamming signals,
we formulate and solve the optimization problem for maximizing
the secrecy rates under malicious attempts from EDs. We then
analyse the cooperation between the primary and secondary
nodes from a game-theoretic perspective where we model their
interaction as a Stackelberg game with a theoretically proved and
computed Stackelberg equilibrium. We show that the spectrum
leasing based on trading secondary access for cooperation by
means of relay and jammer is a promising framework for
enhancing security in CRNs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, physical layer (PHY) security has drawn signifi-
cant attention as an alternative for cryptographic algorithms at
the upper layers of protocol stack in secure communication
systems [1–3] . Security threats may be induced by the
passive eavesdropping node(s) which try to intercept the com-
munication between authenticated nodes. Traditionally, there
have been several significant challenges for cryptographic
approaches of upper layers in protocol stacks, e.g., private
key management complexity, key distribution obstacles, and
key transmission security issues.
Recent years, a promising approach towards achieving
secure communications has been developed by Wyner in
[4]: information theoretic secrecy. The idea of information
theoretic secrecy lies in exploiting the randomness of the com-
munication channels to ensure the secrecy of the transmitted
messages. In PHY security, the figure of merit is secrecy rate
defined as which is the difference between the transmission
rate of the source-destination link and that of the source-
eavesdropper link. However, the secrecy rate would be equal
to zero when the source-destination channel is worse than
the source-eavesdropper channel. For a Gaussian channel, the
achievable secrecy rate equals to the difference between the
mutual information accumulated at the destination and that
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accumulated at the eavesdropper (ED), which is not less than
zero [5].
In addition, many recent studies have focused on particu-
lar interest of the cooperative jamming paradigm. Since the
open nature of the wireless medium makes it susceptible
to malicious eavesdropping. In [6], the authors proposed
cooperative jamming to counter this vulnerability which is
caused by eavesdroppers. In cooperative jamming, includes
interference is created by the network nodes to transmit noise
or codewords to impair the eavesdroppers’ ability in decoding
the confidential information [7]. The authors in [8] considered
the power allocation optimization problem to maximize the
secrecy rate in a two hop wireless relay network. The work in
[9] maximized the secrecy rate of the primary network while
satisfying a required rate for the secondary network by using
the optimal beamformer design at the secondary transmitter
with multiple antennas.
The work in [10] considered the secrecy rate maximization
problem based on game theory, where the jammer introduces
pricing charges for its jamming service based on the amount
of the interference caused to the eavesdropper. This secrecy
rate maximization problem is formulated into a Stackelberg
game where the jammer and the legitimate transmitter play the
roles of leader and follower of the game. In [11], the authors
demonstrated that cooperative jamming leads to substantial se-
crecy rate improvement. This study involved multiple potential
jammers, their competition between which are modeled for
bandwidth access via distributed resource allocation mecha-
nisms such as auctioning and the power control game. With
the goal of maximizing their data transmission rate priced
by the jammer’s power, the transmit power of cooperative
jammers is generally proportional to the amount of leased
bandwidth. In [12], the authors considered a scenario where
an external eavesdropper attempts to decode the primary
users message. The primary user allows the secondary user
to share the primary user’s spectrum to improve its own
secrecy rate through cooperative jamming from the secondary
user. A different setup is investigated in [33], the secondary
user wants to keep its message confidential from the primary
network, which means that the primary receiver is viewed as
an eavesdropper from the secondary network perspective. In
[14], the inner and outer bounds on the capacity equivocation
region are derived.
Recently, there has been a growing interest in modeling and
analyzing communication systems using game-theoretic ap-
proaches. The authors in [15] considered a four-node cognitive
scenario where the secondary receiver (SR) is treated as a po-
tential eavesdropper with respect to the primary transmission.
2The secondary transmitter can help the primary transmission,
while guarantee that the primary message is not leaked to the
secondary user(s). They investigated three different optimiza-
tion problems: the maximization of the primary secrecy rate,
the maximization of the secondary rate and the minimization
of the secondary transmit power. Furthermore, they analyzed
the cooperation between the primary transmitter (PT) and
secondary transmitter (ST) from a game-theoretic perspective,
in which their interaction is modeled as a Stackelberg game.
It is known that the primary and secondary users have their
own interests and thus do not cooperate unconditionally, non-
cooperative game theory tools are a common approach to
model their interaction in cognitive radio networks (CRNs)
with secrecy constraints [16] or without secrecy constraints
[17], [18]. An appropriate model for such scenarios is the
Stackelberg game model [19] with the game leader selling
some fraction of its spectrum and the follower awarded a share
of the spectrum for its cooperation, as in [20].
Cooperative game theory was studied in [22] to demonstrate
the improvement in secrecy capacity of an ad-hoc network,
when users form coalitions to nullify the signals overheard
by eavesdroppers via collaborative beamforming. For a hier-
archical multi-hop system with different potential paths to the
base station, a distributed tree formation game was proposed
in [23]. Han et al. [24] demonstrated Stackelberg game where
a legal transmitter pays a number of external helpers to jam
an eavesdropper, and computed the corresponding equilibrium
prices and convergence properties. They also examined a
similar scenario in [25], where an auction game was used
alternatively to model the transactions between transmitters
and helping jammers. Anand and Chandramouli studied an
M -user non-cooperative power control game with secrecy
considerations in [26], and applied pricing functions to im-
prove the energy efficiency and sum secrecy capacity of the
network. Fakoorian et al. discussed in [27] and [28] how Kalai-
Smorodinsky bargaining solutions and zero-sum games are
adopted to allow the transmitters to find an operating point
that balances network performance and fairness. In [29], game
theory is used by multiple eavesdroppers to decide whether to
collude or not in a MISO wiretap channel. The authors in [30]
modeled the interaction between primary users and secondary
users as a Stackelberg game in which transmission power
levels are the key to maximize data rates. Also, the study
in [33] considers cognitive transmitter should ensure that the
primary message is not leaked to the secondary user by using
cooperative jamming. The authors of this study investigate the
optimal power allocation and power splitting at the secondary
transmitter for cognitive model to maximize the secondary
energy efficiency (EE) under secrecy constraints.
From the above mentioned studies, it can be shown that
the ST can be utilized as either a relay to forward the
primary information or a jammer to send jamming signal.
The target is to enhance primary secrecy rate and improve
secondary transmission rate. Inspired by [8], we propose
a novel scenario where ED can intercept the primary and
secondary transmissions, ST is acted as a trusted relay and
jammer by allocating part of its transmitted power to emit
an artificial noise to create interference to EDs to protect
the primary and secondary transmissions. The main benefit
of this novel scenario is to protect the primary and secondary
transmissions against eavesdroppers whereas previous studies
highlighted only protection of primary transmissions against
eavesdroppers. We assume that primary receiver (PR) and SR
have knowledge of artificial noise to overcome the artificial
noise at a legal receiver.
We study two scenarios where Stackelberg game theory
based cooperative scheme is used to improve the achievable
primary secrecy rate (PSR) and secondary secrecy rate (SSR).
In scenario 1, a single ED is considered as shown in Fig.1,
where the PT broadcasts its encoded signal to ST in Phase
1 with an assumption that the ED is out of range of PT;
then the ST forwards the primary message with artificial noise
to the PR in Phase 2; and the ST sends its own signal with
artificial noise to SR in Phase 3. In this scenario, we applied
Stackelberg game to analyze the primary secrecy rate in Phase
2, and the secondary secrecy rate in Phase 3. Different from the
transmission scheme in scenario 1, in scenario 2 as indicated
in Fig. 2, the SR is applied as multi-antenna jammer in Phase
1 to reduce leakage rate at eavesdroppers. Furthermore, in
scenario 2, we consider the following two types of multiple
eavesdroppers as follows:
• Colluding eavesdroppers: All eavesdroppers can be seen
as a single eavesdropper due to their joint processing
action, and the optimal receiver strategy is based on
maximum ratio combining which combines the effects
of all eavesdroppers in deriving closed forms of PSR and
SSR [21].
• Non-colluding eavesdroppers: The secrecy rate is de-
termined by that of the most malicious eavesdropper,
considering that each eavesdropper overhears the primary
or secondary communication individually.
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Fig. 1: Illustration of cognitive radio (CR) system model in
Scenario 1.
In such networks, a primary node may lease portions of a
licensed spectrum to a secondary node in exchange for some
form of compensation. Moreover, retribution from secondary
to primary nodes is in the form of cooperative relaying
and jamming to enhance primary secret transmission. This
scenario avoids the regulatory issues or money transactions
that commonly hinder the implementation of the property-
rights spectrum leasing concept [39].
In the context of the aforementioned schemes, we propose
novel system designs, the power allocation and the time
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Fig. 2: Illustration of CR system model in Scenario 2.
allocation designs for primary and secondary transmissions
that maximize the achievable PSR and SSR subject to a
total transmit power constraint. We should note that codeword
design for meeting the achievable secrecy rates is not consid-
ered in this work. The main contributions of this work are
summarized as follow:
• In Scenario 1, with a single eavesdropper, we provide an
efficient optimization maximize both PSR and SSR under
the flat fading channel model. In particular, we analyze
and solve the primary and secondary power allocation
problems at the ST using time slot allocation of spectrum
lease.
• In Scenario 1, it is shown that our secrecy rates achieved
with our proposed 3-phase system is higher than of other
studies ([11], [13]) which are based on external jammer
under the same geometric environment.
• In Scenario 2, we study design and analysis for the
proposed CRNs under the malicious attempt of mul-
tiple eavesdroppers (colluding eavesdroppers and non-
colluding eavesdroppers) around ST to highlight the
impact of multiple eavesdroppers on the PSR and SSR.
We analyze and solve the power allocation problem and
time allocation problem.
• In Scenario 2, it is shown that the secrecy rate achieved
for CRNs under the colluding eavesdropper is significant-
ly lower than that under non-colluding eavesdroppers.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we define our system model and achievable secrecy
rates in cognitive Scenario 1. Section III presents the possible
optimization problems for the given scenarios and their game-
theoretic approach in Scenario 2. We then compare those
scenarios through numerical simulations in Section IV. Finally,
Section V concludes this paper.
II. ENHANCING SECRECY RATES USING STACKELBERG
GAME: A SINGLE EAVESDROPPER (SCENARIO 1)
In this section, we considered a cooperative CRNs where
the ST is allowed to access the primary spectrum, as long as it
acted as the jammer for the ED and the relay for the primary
transmission as illustrated in Fig. 1, consisting of the following
single antenna nodes: a PT, a PR, a cognitive ST, an SR and a
single ED (i.e., Scenario 1). We assume that the legal primary
and secondary destinations have a priori knowledge of the
jamming signal sent by the ST (relay). This is achieved by
communicating the legal source and destination in a two-step
process. In the first step, the phase response of the channel
is probed, and in the second step the information bearing
signal is modified to precompensate for the phase effects of
the channel. Since the channels between the legal source and
destination are completely different from the channels between
the legal source and eavesdroppers, this process is secure
([34], [35]). We assume the following: i) each node carries
a single omnidirectional antenna; ii) the relaying strategy of
decode-and-forward (DF) is employed; and iii) global channel
state information (CSI) is available by a standard channel
estimation (CE) technique, e.g., the training based CE (TBCE).
In TBCE technique, the pilot symbols are used for acquiring
an estimated CSI prior to actual data transmission, then the
channel is estimated using the combined knowledge of the
transmitted and received signals [37] and [38]. To enhance the
achievable secrecy rate, the ST allocates part of its transmit
power to emit jamming signal, and the rest of its transmit
power to emit information signal.
For the transmit single message W , which is uniformly
distributed over
{
1, . . . , 2nR
}
with R as the rate of commu-
nication, and the n is the block length of communication. The
sender maps W to Xn = X1, . . . , Xn, the intended receiver
receives Y n = Y1, . . . , Yn and decodes Wˆ , and eavesdropper
overhears the output Zn = Z1, . . . , Zn. The perfect secrecy
rate Rsec is considered as achievable if for any  > 0, there
exists a sequence of codes (2nR, n) such that for any n > n(),
we have [40]
Pne = P
(
W 6= Wˆ
)
≤ , Re = 1
n
H (W |Zn) ≥ Rsec − ε,
(1)
where Re is the equivocation rate.
The secrecy capacity Csec is defined as the maximum
achievable perfect secrecy rate, which is given as
Csec
∆
= sup
Pne ≤ε
Rsec = max
fW
[I(X,Y )− I(X,Z)]+. (2)
The achievable secrecy rate can be defined as
Rsec =[max
fW
(I(X,Y ))−max
fW
(I(X,Z))]+
=(RD −RE)+, (3)
where RD is the maximum information rate from the transmit-
ter to the intended receiver, and RE is the maximum leakage
rate from the transmitter to the eavesdropper. For convenience,
we remove the (·)+ sign from here on.
A. Proposed Cooperative CRNs
Our system has three phases as follows:
1) Phase 1: The PT decides to allocate only a fraction (1−
α) of the whole time slot for transmission from the PT to the
ST (where 0 < α < 1.). The remaining fraction will be used
in Phases 2 and 3. We assume that transmission from the PT
is invisible at the ED. The PT encodes a confidential message
4into a N−length block codeword (s), where PT has power
constraint as follows [30]:
Pp =
1
N
N∑
k=1
|sk|2 ≤ PMAX , (4)
where PMAX is the maximum primary power of PT. In phase
I, the ST is used as a relay and the received signal at ST is
XST =
√
Pphpss+ nST , (5)
where s is the primary message signal, Pp is the primary
power level, nST ∼ CN (0, σ2) is the noise at ST, and
hps ∼ CN (0, σ2h) is the channel coefficient between PT and
ST. For notational convenience, let us define
ρps =
Pp |hps|2
σ2
.
Then, the information rate at the ST, RPS , is obtained as
RPS = (1− α) log2(1 + ρps). (6)
2) Phase 2: The ST then forwards secure primary message
to the PR within the fraction αβ (where 0 < β < 1) of the
considered time slot1. In this phase, for security reason, the ST
also sends the artificial noise (denoted by z)2 using a faction
(1 − ) of the available power level Ps (where 0 <  < 1).
Furthermore, the ST encodes a confidential message into same
a n−length block codeword of phase 1, where ST has power
constrained as follows
Ps =
1
n
n∑
k=1
|sˆk|2 ≤ Ps,MAX , (7)
where Ps,MAX is the maximum secondary power of ST. The
received signal at the PR after removing the artificial noise
(which is assumed to be known at the PR) is
XPR =
√
Pshspsˆ+ nPR, (8)
and the received signal at the ED in Phase 2 is
X
(2)
ED =
√
Pshsesˆ+
√
(1− )Pshsez + nED, (9)
where sˆ is the re-encoded primary message signal, the artificial
noise z ∼ CN (0, 1), hsp ∼ CN (0, σ2h) is the channel
coefficient between the ST and the PR, and hse ∼ CN (0, σ2h)
is the channel coefficient between the ST and the ED. After
removing the artificial noise, the information rate at PR is
obtained as
RSP = αβ log2(1 + ρsp), (10)
where
ρsp =
Ps |hsp|2
σ2
.
Then the information leakage at the ED in Phase 2 is
R
(2)
SE = αβ log2(
(1 + ρse)
(1 + (1− )ρse) ), (11)
1We consider a single ST only in this work. However, for the case of
multiple STs, the relay selection process can be applied before the most
competitive ST can be chosen to deliver the message to the PR
2Note that the PR could also do the same thing in Phase 1 by sending
the artificial noise to interfere with the reception of eavesdropper in Phase
1. This will certainly improve secure rate, however, at the expense of more
power consumption.
where
ρse =
Ps |hse|2
σ2
.
According to [8], the achievable PSR, denoted by RPSEC ,
can be written as
RPSEC = RSP −R(2)SE
= αβ(log2(1 + ρsp)−
log2(
(1 + ρse)
(1 + (1− )ρse) )). (12)
3) Phase 3: The ST then send its own secure secondary
message to the SR within the remaining faction α(1 − β)
of the considered time slot. Again, we assume that the same
codeword for artificial noise and the same power allocation
strategy (i.e., same ) are used for this secondary transmission
to simplify our analysis. The received signal at the SR (after
removing the artificial noise) is
XSR =
√
Pshsss1 + nSR, (13)
while the received signal at the ED in phase 3 is
X
(3)
ED =
√
Pshses1 +
√
(1− )Pshsez + nED, (14)
where s1 is the secondary message signal and hss ∼
CN (0, σ2h) is the channel coefficient between the ST and SR.
After removing the artificial noise at SR, the information rate
at the SR is represented as
RSS = α(1− β) log2(1 + ρss), (15)
where
ρss =
Ps |hss|2
σ2
.
Also, the leakage rate at the ED in this phase can be written
as
R
(3)
SE = α(1− β) log2(
(1 + ρse)
(1 + (1− )ρse) ). (16)
Similarly, we can obtain SSR, denoted by RSSEC as
RSSEC = RSS −R(3)SE
= α(1− β) (log2(1 + ρss)
− log2
(
(1 + ρse)
(1 + (1− )ρse)
))
. (17)
B. Maximization of Achievable Secrecy Rates Using Stackel-
berg Game
We can formulate the maximization problem of available
secrecy rates as a Stackelberg game where the PT is considered
as the leader and the ST is the follower. The leader will
try to maximize its primary secrecy rate Rpsec while the
follower will try to maximize its utility. The PT’s optimal
transmission parameters (α∗, β∗) and the corresponding power
choice of the ST, ∗, are jointly referred as the Stackelberg
equilibrium. We can consider interaction between the primary
and secondary transmissions as shown in Fig. 3. The ST is
aware of parameters (α, β) and optimizes its power level
towards the goal of maximizing its utility:
USSEC(α, β, (α, β)) = RSSEC − k, (18)
5Fig. 3: Stackelberg game model
where k is the pricing constant. We present the following
lemma.
Lemma 1. The utility of secondary transmission in (18) is
concave in terms of .
Proof: In order to prove the concavity of the secondary
transmission’s utility, we derive the second derivative of (18)
with respect to  as
∂2USSEC
∂2
= q
(
− ρ
2
ss
(1 + ρss)2
− ρ
2
se
(1 + (1− )ρse)2
)
, (19)
where q = α(1−β)/(ln 2). Obviously, the second derivative in
(19) is negative. Thus, the utility of the secondary transmission
is concave in terms of .
The optimal solution of secondary transmission problem can
be obtained as follows
∗ = arg max
0<α,β,<1
USSEC(α, β, (α, β)). (20)
To find optimum ∗, we can differentiate Ussec with respect
to  and equate it to zero, as follows:
∂USSEC
∂
= q
(
ρss
(1 + ρss)
− ρse
(1 + (1− )ρse)
)
− k = 0
⇒ k/q = ρss
(1 + ρss)
− ρse
(1 + (1− )ρse) (21)
After simplification, we can obtain  as
a2 + b+ c = 0, (22)
where
a = ρssρse, (23)
b = ρse − ρss − ρssρse − 2ρssρseq
k
, (24)
c =
q
c1
(ρss − ρse + ρssρse)− ρse − 1. (25)
Therefore, the optimal ∗ is
∗ =

0, 2 ≤ 0
1, 1 ≤ 1
max∈{1,2} Ussec(), 0 ≤ 1 ≤ 2 ≤ 1
max∈{0,1,i} Ussec(), only i ∈ [0, 1], i = 1 or 2
(26)
where
1 =
−b−√b2 − 4ac
2a
, 2 =
−b+√b2 − 4ac
2a
.
The PT, acting as the game leader, determines the fraction α
and the ratio β towards the goal of maximizing its secrecy
rate, knowing that its decision will affect the strategy selected
by the ST (the follower). The solution is given as
α∗, β∗ = arg max
0<α,β,<1
RPSEC(α, β, 
∗(α, β)) (27)
Theorem 1. The allocated power level ∗ and time slot α∗
are the Nash equilibrium of the proposed game.
Proof: According to DF scheme, we would assume that
Rsp ≤ Rps in order to find the relationship between α and β
to facilitate the solution of the above optimization problem.
We can obtain the following relationship according to the
assumption of DF scheme.
RSP = RPS
⇒ β = (1− α)
α
log2(1 + ρps)
log2(1 + ρsp)
. (28)
According to lemma 1, USSEC is strictly concave in terms of
 for a given values of α and β. Furthermore,RPSEC is an
increasing function of α then the primary transmission (leader)
will select the best response ∗(α) of secondary transmission
(follower) as
α∗ = argmaxRPSEC(α, ∗(α)). (29)
Therefore, α∗ and ∗(α∗) form the Nash equilibrium of the
proposed Stackelberg game.
III. EXTENSION TO MULTIPLE EAVESDROPPERS
(SCENARIO 2)
We consider Scenario 2 (see Fig. 2), by having multiple
eavesdroppers which are located in the range of the ST, to
highlight the effect of multiple eavesdroppers on the secrecy
rates. In this case , we cannot consider same assumption as in
Scenario 1 that all eavesdroppers are located out of range of
the PT, to enhance the secure transmission, we consider SR as
jammer with multiple transmit antennas and transmit jamming
signal at phase I. The three phases for both cases of colluding
and non colluding eavesdroppers are considered. Furthermore,
we derive closed form expressions for both PSR and SSR in
each case.
A. Case I: Colluding Eavesdroppers
In this case, all eavesdroppers are cooperated through a
central processing so they can be considered as a single
eavesdropper with multiple antennas. Also, we assume that
the eavesdroppers are homogeneous, i.e., each eavesdropper
experiences the same received signal power on average, and
that all eavesdroppers are uniformly located around legitimate
transmitter ST [21].
1) Phase 1: We consider the PT cooperates with ST by
allocated only a fraction (1−α) of the whole time slot whereas
the SR, with multiple transmit antennas, sends the jamming
signal using power vector wJ to both of the ST and ED within
6the fraction (1−α). In this phase, the received signal XST at
the ST is
XST =
√
Pphpss+
√
PJhrswJzJ + nST , (30)
where h(rs) ∼ N (0K , d−δIK) is the channel vector (of length
K due to K multiple transmit antennas at SR) between SR
and ST, zJ ∼ CN (0, 1), δ is the path loss exponent, d is
the distance between SR and ST and nST ∼ CN (0, σ2). The
received signal at the EDi (where i = 1, 2, ..N ) in Phase 1 is
XPE,i =
√
Pphpes+
√
PJhrewJzJ + nED,i, (31)
where h(re) ∼ N (0K , d−δIK) is the channel vector (of length
K due to K multiple transmit antennas at SR) between SR
and ST, nED,i ∼ CN (0, σ2). Using projection matrix theory
to remove an interference of SR (jammer) in legal receiver
(ST) , we can achieve |wJ | as follows
|wJ | = (I− hrs(hrshrs
†)−1h†rs)hre∣∣∣((I− hrs(hrshrs†)−1h†rs)hre∣∣∣ , (32)
where |wJwJ †| = 1
Therefore, the information rate at ST is is given by (6)
whereas the leakage rate at EDi can be written as follows:
RPE,i = (1− α) log2
1 + Pphpe
σ2 + PJ
∣∣∣h†reWJhre∣∣∣
 , (33)
where WJ = wJwJ †.
2) Phase 2: The ST has DF relay function and forwards
secure primary message sˆ to PR in αβ in presence of L
eavesdroppers according to a parameter 0 < β < 1. The
received signal XPR and rate RSP are given by (8) and (10)
respectively due to canceling of artificial noise in PR. Then
the leakage rate RSEi at ith ED can be written as
RSE,i = αβ log2(1+
Pshse
σ2 + PJ
∣∣∣h†reWJhre∣∣∣+ (1− )Pshse ),
(34)
where hse ∼ CN (0, σ2h) is the channel coefficient between
ST and the ith ED. According to [21] and [36], the authors
take the sum of the signal to interference and noise ratio
(SINR)s of the colluding eavesdroppers due to their coop-
eration. In our paper, we assume that a central processing
unit will handle the sequential Markov chain observations
among eavesdroppers and according to [32], we can approxi-
mate (
∑L
i=1 log2(1 + SINRi))
∼=∑Li=1 SINRi considering
the approximation (log2(1 + SINRi)) ∼= SINRi for long
distance transmissions or energy-limited scenarios. Further-
more, this assumption represents worst case of eavesdroppers
(i.e.(
∑L
i=1 log2(1 + SINRi) > log2(1 +
∑L
i=1 SINRi))).
Therefore, we rewrite RSE as
RSE =
L∑
i=1
RSE,i
(2)
=
L∑
i=1
αβ (log2(1+
Pshse
σ2 + PJ
∣∣∣h†reWJhre∣∣∣+ (1− )Pshse )
 .(35)
Also, the information rate RP at PR is given as
RP = min(RPS , RSP )
= min (log2(1 + ρps), log2(1 + ρsp)) . (36)
The achievable primary secrecy rate RPSEC can then be
written as
RPSEC = αβ
(
Rp −
L∑
i=1
log2(1+
Pshse
σ2 + PJ
∣∣∣h†reWJhre∣∣∣+ (1− )Pshse )
 .(37)
2) Phase 3: The ST transmits secondary message to SR in
time slot α(1 − β) in the presence of L eavesdroppers. The
secondary receiver SR extracts only information signal, then
the information rate at the SR is given by (15), while the rate
at multiple eavesdroppers is represented as
RSE
(3) =
L∑
i=1
(α(1− β)(log2(1+
Pshse
σ2 + PJ
∣∣∣h†reWJhre∣∣∣+ (1− )Pshse )
 .(38)
We can obtain secondary secrecy rate RSSEC by substitut-
ing Rss and Rse as
USSEC = RSSEC − k = RSS −R(3)SE − k
= α(1− β)(log2(1 + ρss)
−
L∑
i=1
(α(1− β) (log2(1+
Pshse
σ2 + PJ
∣∣∣h†reWJhre∣∣∣+ (1− )Pshse )

− k. (39)
Lemma 2. The utility of secondary transmission in colluding
eavesdroppers that has the identical channel gains of colluding
eavesdroppers around legal transmitter are concave in terms
of .
Proof: Since all eavesdroppers have identical channel
gains around ST and SR, we can consider that
|hse,1| = |hse,2| = ... = |hse,L|
which leads to
ρse,1 = ρse,2 = ... = ρse,L = ρse.
Also, we assume
|hre,1| = |hre,2| = ... = |hre,L|
Therefore, the achievable USSEC is written as
USSEC = Rssec − k = Rss −Rse − k
= α(1− β)(log2(1 + ρss)− log2(1+
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Fig. 4: Secrecy rate: comparison with jammer caused interfer-
ence at legal receiver approach
Pshse
σ2 + PJ
∣∣∣h†reWJhre∣∣∣+ (1− )Pshse )

− k. (40)
In order to prove the concavity of the secondary transmission’s
utility, we derive the second derivative of (40) with respect to
 as
∂2USSEC
∂2
= q
( −ρ2ss
(1 + ρss)2
+
−Lρ2se
1 +
PJ |h†reWJhre|
σ2 + (1− )ρse
(41)
where q = α(1 − β)/2 ln 2. Obviously, the second derivative
in (41) is negative and therefore the utility of secondary
transmission in colluding eavesdroppers is concave in terms
of .
We consider the same interaction between the primary and
secondary transmissions as shown in Fig. 3. This case reflects
the impact of L eavesdroppers on the PSR and SSR. To find
optimum ∗, we can differentiate USSEC with respect to . We
assume ρre =
PJ |h†reWJhre|
σ2 for simplicity, then the optimal
∗ is one of the positive real roots of a2 + b+ c = 0, where
a,b and c are given as
a = ρssρse, (42)
b = ρse − ρss − ρssρse − ρssρre
− (1 + L)ρssρseq
k
, (43)
c =
q
c1
(ρss − Lρse + ρssρse + ρssρre)
− ρse − 1− ρre. (44)
Then we can apply theorem 1 to find optimum values of
(α, β).
B. Case 2: Non-colluding Eavesdroppers
We consider all eavesdroppers having non-homogeneous
distribution around the ST (i.e., eavesdroppers are distributed
randomly with different distances around the ST). In this
case, each eavesdropper will have their own information rate,
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Fig. 5: Secrecy rate: comparison with friendly jammer without
interference at legal receiver approach
denoted now by Rse,i, i = 1, 2, · · · , L. Thus, we formulate
the two following problems:
1) Problem 1: Maximizing PSR in Phase 2 for its worst
case scenario:
max
0<α,β,<1
min
i
Rpsec,i (45)
where i = 1, 2, .., L,, Rpsec,i = Rps −Rse,i, and R(2)se,i is the
leakage rate of the ith ED in Phase 2. Note that
min
i
Rpsec,i = Rps −max
i
R
(2)
se,i.
2) Problem 2: Maximizing SSR in Phase 3 for its worst
case scenario:
max
0<α,β,<1
min
i
Rssec,i (46)
where Rssec,i = Rss − R(3)se,i and R(3)se,i is the leakage rate of
the ith ED in Phase 3. Similarly, we have
min
i
Rssec,i = Rss −max
i
R
(3)
se,i.
To solve the aforementioned two problems, we can consider
standard max min problem. The min problem is solved and
then we can apply the proposed Stackelberg game based
algorithm in Scenario 1 to find the suboptimal values of α, β,
and , which corresponds to the worst case of eavesdropping.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present the numerical results and related
discussion. We consider the two optimization problems from
the previous sections according to the Stackelberg game. We
studied the secrecy performance under two scenarios: Scenario
1 and Scenario 2.
A. Scenario 1: Comparison with previous work:
In this section, we compare our proposed system with
jammer that caused an interference in legal receiver as in
[13]. We consider the same setting used in this previous study
in [13]: Ps=2mw, noise variance σ2 =1mw, pricing factor
k = 0.01, |hps|2 = 0.6, |hse|2 = 0.3 and |hss|2 = 0.8. In
[13], the authors considered two secondary users (one the relay
and another for jammer) in order to enhance the secrecy rates
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in primary transmission of CR. In this previous study, there
are two schemes which represented by relay and non friendly
jammer (R-J) and equal-duration relay non-friendly jammer
(EDRJ). Note that the only difference between EDRJ and R-J
schemes is that in EDRJ scheme the time durations for the
first two phases are equal and the secrecy rate is maximized
without considering time allocation. We now compare our
proposed scheme with these two schemes. Fig. 4 indicates that
the proposed system outperforms the R-J and EDRJ schemes
significantly due to removal an interference of jamming signal
in legal destinations.
Furthermore, Fig.5 indicates the comparison between pro-
posed system and equal-duration relay jammer transmission-
s(EDJ) with respect to hse. EDJ scheme included the SR
is treated as a potential eavesdropper with respect to the
primary transmission. Since the primary users are the legacy
owners of the spectrum, the confidentiality of the primary
message should be considered. In this context, the primary
transmitter PT may be assisted by the trustworthy secondary
transmitter ST if the cooperation could improve the secrecy
performance, while the ST benefits as it is awarded a share
of the spectrum for its data transmission. Therefore, ST is
acted as friendly jammer and the time duration of primary
and jammer transmissions are same. This scheme is similar to
jammer’s operation in [11] except that EDJ doesn’t cause an
interference in legal transmitter. This comparison is performed
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Fig. 9: α∗ and β∗ versus between PT and ST
to highlight the effect of an interaction between the time
and power allocation by Stackelberg game on performing
balance process between maximum values for both primary
and secondary secrecy rates. We note that primary secrecy
rate of proposed system is slightly less than of friendly jam-
mer especially in high channel coefficient between legitimate
transmitter and eavesdropper, whereas secondary secrecy rate
of proposed system is significantly higher than that of friendly
jammer. Also, the proposed system has the gap between the
primary and secondary secrecy rates that less significantly than
of EDJ scheme. This feature which proves that the PSR and
SSR of Stackelberg game is fairer than that of EDJ due to the
tradeoff between allocated power  and time durations α and
β to obtain maximum values for both primary and secondary
secrecy rates.
B. Fixed locations of the PR, ST and SR:
We fix the PR, ST and SR locations at the coordinates (0,
0.6), (0, 0) and (0, 0.4), respectively, to find the effect of PT
and ED distances on the PSR and SSR. These coordinates are
normalized to square area with 1km2. We assume path loss
model hij = d−δ is used with path loss exponent δ = 3. We
also consider the primary and secondary signal to noise ratios
(SNRs) are 5 dB and the pricing coefficient is k = 0.25.
Figure 6 indicates the optimum primary and secondary
secrecy rates with respect to distance between PT and ST
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when the coordinates of the ED is fixed at (1, 0). It is noted
that optimum secrecy rates of both primary and secondary
transmissions decrease when the PT is farther away from the
ST, , this is because of the decreasing ρps would reduce Rps
according to (6). Therefore, the information rate of relay (ST)
decreases according to the condition Rsp ≤ Rps.
Fig. 7 shows the optimum PSR and SSR with respect to
distance of the ED when the location of the PT is fixed at (0.2,
0). It is noted that optimum secrecy rates of both primary and
secondary transmissions increase when the ED is further away
from the ST because the information rate of the ED decreases
with degradation of hse according to (12) and (17).
Figure 8 shows the optimum  (power level fraction of the
ST to carry the message signal) with respect to the distance
between the PT and ST when the coordinates of the ED is
fixed at (1.0, 0). We find that optimum  reduces when the PT
is far away from the ST, this is because the received power at
the ST decreases with increasing the distance between ED and
ST. On the other hand, this figure shows the optimum  versus
the distance between ED and ST when the coordinates of the
PT is fixed at (0,0.2). It is noted that optimum  increases when
ED is farther from the ST, this is because (1− ∗) decreases
due to decreasing of the information rate of the ED.
Fig.9 shows the optimum α and β versus the distance be-
tween the PT and ST when the coordinates of the ED is fixed at
(1.0,0). We can find that β∗ slightly changes with the distance,
whereas α∗ is significantly decreased with the distance for two
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Fig. 12: Secondary secrecy rate versus ρsp
 
 
 P
ri
m
ar
y
 S
ec
re
cy
 R
at
e 
(b
it
s/
s/
H
z)
1.5
2.5
2
1
   3 4 5 6 7 8   2
 Scheme I 
 Scheme II
 Number of Eavesdroppers 
Fig. 13: Primary secrecy rate versus number of eavesdropper
reasons: firstly the activation time of transmission between
the PT and the relay is independent of β∗ according to (6);
secondly, the activation time of transmission between relay
ST and PR decreases with increasing (1 − α∗) (time slot of
transmission between the PT and relay) due to the degradation
of hps and Rps according to (6).
Figure 10 indicates that optimum α and β versus the
distance between the ED and ST when the coordinates of PT
is (0,0.2). It is noted that β∗ is reduced significantly because
hse has main effect on relay and secondary transmissions in
Phase 2 (β∗α∗) and Phase 3 α∗(1−β∗) according to (12) and
(17), respectively. In another observation, α∗ decreases less
significantly because hse has no effect on Phase 1 (1−α∗) of
the primary transmission due to our assumption that primary
transmission is invisible at the ED.
C. Fixed locations of the PT, PR, ST and SR:
The locations of the PT, PR, ST and SR are fixed at the
coordinates (0,0.2),(0.6, 0), (0, 0) and (0, 0.4), respectively, in
order to find the effect of ρsp on the secrecy rates in two later
phases. We consider three schemes depending on locations of
EDas follow: Scheme I (1.0,0), Scheme II (0.9,0) and Scheme
III (0.6,0). Figures 11 and 12 indicate the optimum primary
and secondary secrecy rates with respect to ρsp in these three
schemes. It is noted that the optimum secrecy rates of the three
schemes increase significantly with ρsp according to (12) and
(17), respectively.
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D. Scenario 2
We consider same locations and parameters as in the pre-
ceding subsection with K=2. Figures 13 and 14 indicate that
primary and secondary secrecy rates decrease significantly in
both cases with increasing number of eavesdroppers according
to (37) and (40). We can also note that scheme II (non-
colluding eavesdroppers) has secrecy rate higher than scheme
I (colluding eavesdroppers) because scheme I combines the
effects of all eavesdroppers whereas scheme II picks the worst
response (minimum secrecy rate) from one of the eavesdrop-
pers.
Figure 15 shows that ∗ reduces significantly with increasing
number of eavesdroppers, due to the fact that more power
should be allocated to the artificial noise with increasing the
number of eavesdroppers. Also, ∗ has higher level when the
distance between ST and ED increases, due to the fact that less
power should be allocated to the artificial noise with reducing
of Res1.
Figure 16 shows that α∗ increases significantly with in-
creasing number of eavesdroppers because we need to increase
activation time of phases II and III to keep reasonable values
of secrecy rates with increasing the number of eavesdroppers.
Furthermore, α∗ is needed to increase with further distance
between ST and ED.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a game theory based cooperation
method to optimize the primary secrecy rate and secondary se-
crecy rate in CRNs. This mechanism is built upon the spectrum
leasing paradigm, wherein a secondary transmitter is permitted
to use some of its own power level to transmit an artificial
noise to destination(s) while the legitimate destination has
prior knowledge of the artificial noise. Interaction between the
cooperative nodes is based on the Stackelberg game concept.
We considered two scenarios, single eavesdropper and multiple
eavesdroppers, where we formulated and solved optimization
problems in each scheme aiming at maximizing the achievable
secrecy rates on the primary and secondary transmissions
subject to allocated power and lease time slot constraints.
Numerical results confirmed that our proposed cooperative
scheme significantly improves the secrecy rates of the CRNs.
Furthermore, we remark numerically that achievable PSR and
SSR of Stackelberg game is fairer than that of other existing
algorithms due to the tradeoff between the allocated power
and the time slot durations by Stackelberg game.
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